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Historically, the intelligence community has been unprepared to meet emerging threats. This is
due to intelligence focusing on current and past threats rather than being oriented towards the
future. The attacks on 9/11 and subsequent war on terrorism only cemented this fact. This study
looks at the history of intelligence to reveal this pattern along with relevant reforms to the
intelligence community. Unfortunately, the current reforms only meet the needs of the current
issues facing the intelligence community without preparing the community for the future.
Looking at potential threats faced by the nation, the potential shortfalls in intelligence become
known. This study proposes four reform areas that are required in the intelligence community
and ways to implement the reforms. Ultimately, unless further reforms are implemented, the
intelligence community may remain unprepared to meet the intelligence needs of future conflicts
and operations.
Refocusing Intelligence:
Keeping Intelligence Relevant Beyond the Global War on Terrorism
Robert Kollas
1"Prediction is difficult, especially about the future"
Niels Bohr
On September 11, 2001, the intelligence services of the United States, as well as much of
the world, were caught unaware. Prior to that event, there had been large terrorist attacks, but
nothing that compared to the scale and scope of the attacks on the World Trade Center and
Pentagon. The planning, resources, and execution that went into these attacks were immense, yet
all the signs were missed. However, the subsequent investigation found many of indicators
leading up to the attacks existed in databases. Up to this time though, very little emphasis had
been placed on terrorism, and the warning signs were ignored. Since 9111, the intelligence
community has become more adept at tracking potential terrorist plots and stopping potential
terrorists from attempting attacks, however, has the United States left itself open to other
strategic threats?
Does the tendency to focus primarily on current or past conflicts severely hinder long-
term intelligence readiness? Also, how has intelligence reform affected this trend? If the current
focus has a tendency to hinder long-term readiness, the possibility exists to miss or ignore an
emerging threat until it is too late. This has already happened in the past, with both 9/11 as well
as Pearl Harbor. Intelligence needs to be able to see beyond the current conflict and be forward
looking. While analyzing what has happened is a large part of intelligence, the ability to provide
predictive analysis is far greater.
In order to determine the effect of conflict focus, this paper will begin by examining the
history of intelligence, from the American Revolution through the global war on terrorism. It will
2also look intelligence reform that has been completed since 9111. Then the paper will discuss
some emerging threats to national security before discussing the needed intelligence reform to
prevent another surprise attack catching the country unaware.
History
Although intelligence organizations were not formally created until the late 1800's,
intelligence has been utilized since the earliest days of the United States. Under the direction of
General George Washington, the second Continental Congress created the Committee of Secret
Correspondence which focused on foreign communications and the gathering of information
related to foreign affairs. 1 Along with the Committee of Secret Correspondence, the Continental
Congress had previously created the Secret Committee, which was charged with the clandestine
procurement of military supplies. The Secret Committee worked in conjunction with the
Committee of Secret Correspondence in the gathering of intelligence on British supplies both
domestically and abroad. The Committee of Secret Correspondence evolved into the Committee
on Foreign Affairs and then into the Department of Foreign Affairs, the precursor to the current
Department of State. This organization retained its mission of" ... obtaining the most extensive
and useful information relative to foreign affairs.,,2
Many of the original intelligence activities during the revolutionary war were due to
General George Washington's belief in the necessity of intelligence. Washington was
responsible for creating small units that conducted intelligence and reconnaissance. One such
unit was Knowlton's Rangers named for their commander Lieutenant Colonel Thomas
1Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence In the War af Independence, (Washington D.C.: Center for the Study of
Intelligence, 1997), under "Organization of Intelligence."
2 Ibid.
3Knowlton, who is considered to be one of the first military intelligence professionals. The unit
itself is considered a forefather to the Army's modern day Special Forces and Rangers.' There
were also many other significant personalities in the early days of intelligence that assisted in
intelligence gathering and operations. These efforts ranged from counterintelligence to
propagandist information operations."
The Civil War saw the beginnings of technological collection efforts. Both the North and
South utilized balloons to collect information on encampments and movements, although the
North had more success than the South.' Another key piece oftechnology utilized during the
Civil War was the telegraph which allowed for the quick transmission of information between
forces and locations. Although useful, the telegraph was easily compromised with opposing sides
able to easily tap the telegraph lines and copy the messages." Due to this drawback, both sides
continued to utilize couriers and cryptographic codes to prevent the loss of their messages. It was
also during this time that saw the Union create the Bureau of Military Information, an early
precursor to the Military Information Division. This bureau was created by Colonel George
Sharp, under orders from his commander, Major General Joseph Hooker. Through this bureau,
Sharp was able to provide thorough details of Confederate force strengths and movements. 7
Ultimately, the Bureau of Military Information of disbanded at the end ofthe Civil War.8
Intelligence would remain an ad-hoc creation through the first century of America's
existence. In 1885 the Secretary of War posed to a question to the Adjutant General, Brigadier
3 P. K. Rose, The Founding Fathers of American Intelligence, (Washington D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence,
1999).
4 Rose; CIA. Intelligence in the War of Independence, under "Personalities."
5 CIA, Intelligence in the Civil War, (Washington D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005), under
"Intelligence's New Tools."
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., under "The Bureau of Military information.,"
8 lbid., under "Epilogue."
4General R.C. Drum which the general was unable to answer. This spurred the creation of the
Military Information Division (MID) in the army while the Office of Naval Intelligence had been
established earlier in 1882.9
Although established, the newly formed intelligence agencies remained ad-hoc for a
period oftime through the Spanish-American and Philippine wars. The information provided by
the MID to deploying forces to the Philippines consisted of only the Encyclopedia Britannica's
entry on the Islands. This led commanders on the ground to develop their own forms of
collection that were ultimately combined into a centralized bureau as the war went on.1O While
the MID created in 1885, and its subsequent efforts in the Spanish-American and Philippine wars
were deemed successful, the creation of the Military General Staff in 1903 nearly destroyed
intelligence in the military. Intelligence remained an afterthought until just before 1917 when the
by then Major, Ralph Van Deman had managed to speak to the Secretary of War and was
granted permission to redevelop a military intelligence service. 11
While Van Deman's work was primarily at the strategic level, General John Pershing saw
the need for tactical intelligence while commander of U.S. Forces during WWI. Mimicking his
European counterparts, GEN Pershing created organic intelligence sections at every unit level,
formalizing what had partially occurred in the Philippines; however these organizations still
lacked standardization. 12 WWl also saw the further technical advances in the gathering of
9 The Military Information Division is also referred to in literature as the Division of Military Intelligence, Military
Intelligence Division and others. Military Information Division is its most common name and is used throughout
this paper. Elizabeth Bethel, "The Military Information Division: Origin of the Intelligence Division," Mmtary Affairs
11, no. 1 (Spring 1947), p. 17-18.
10 Brian McAllister linn, "Intelligence and Low-Intensity Conflict in the Philippine War, 1899-1902." Intelligence and
Notional Security 6 no. 1 (1991), p. 91
11Military Intelligence Officer Training Course, "History of Military Intelligence," (lecture, Military Intelligence
Officer Transition Course, Ft. Huachuca, AZ.) posted by Federation of American Scientists.
12 Ibid.
5intelligence. The widespread use of aircraft and aerial photography brought the advent of
imagery intelligence (lMINT), along with the use of radio communication which brought about
signals intelligence (SIGINT). While all-source information was available, reliance remained on
information gathered from prisoners and raids or what is known as human intelligence
(HUMINT) at lower command levels.l ' During this time period, the military intelligence services
continued to work with Department of State with the collection of foreign intelligence.l"
As with previous inter-conflict periods, the interwar period between WWI and WWII saw
a decrease in the emphasis placed on intelligence.P WWII however, saw further improvements
both in the military intelligence services and the national intelligence services. Prior to American
involvement in the war, the Office of the Coordinator ofInformation, later to be the Office of
Strategic Services (OSS) was created by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the nation's first
specific peacetime intelligence service. This organization, the predecessor to the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), was created to perform espionage, sabotage and other activities
needed to assist in defeating the Germans in WWII.16 By creating an agency specifically for
espionage, it shifted some responsibilities from the Department of State that they had held since
they were the Committee of Secret Correspondence. Along with the evolution of intelligence that
occurred at the national level, the military intelligence services that were started prior to and
during WWI continued to evolve as well. The MID set up by VanDeman transitioned to the
Army Intelligence System in 1944 and continued the use of all-source analysis.!" At the lower
tactical levels, the organic intelligence services originally created by GEN Pershing were
13 Ibid.
14 Michael A. Turner, Why Secret Intelligence Fails, (Dulles, VA: Potomac, 2005), p. 19
15 Military Intelligence Officer Training Course.
16 Richard Harris Smith, OSSthe Secret History 0/ America's First Centra/Intelligence Agency. (Guilford, CT: Lyons,
2005), p.l.
17 Military Intelligence Officer Training Course.
6standardized so that one intelligence shop operated no differently than the next, streamlining
tactical intelligence. After the war was completed, militarily the country demobilized limiting
advances in intelligence through a lack of manning as in previous inter-conflict periods. 18
However, the National Security Act of 1947 reinforced the intelligence community at the
national level. The act turned the OSS into the CIA, created the National Security Council and
reorganized the military forces. 19
The Korean War saw a loss of abilities militarily along with mistakes by the relatively
newly formed CIA. With the force drawdown after WWII and subsequent reconstitution of the
national army for the Korea War saw military intelligence suffer manning issues. Compounding
this was a lack of trained linguists, which affected both radio collection as well as interrogations
of prisoners. As the conflict progressed, military intelligence regained the abilities that it had lost
after WWII. 20 Vietnam saw a similar issue on the side of military intelligence, with a lack of
trained linguists, along with an over-reliance on new technology that was not fully effective for
the environment. Further hindering military intelligence during these wars was that intelligence
units were typically attached to the commands they supported rather than belonging directly to
the command. These attached sections were also limited in the types of intelligence they
collected and analyzed rather than being all-source.f
Nationally, the Korean and Vietnam Wars saw errors by the CIA as it came into its own
as a new agency. In Korea, the CIA missed the invasion of the North and the subsequent
involvement by the Chinese, while in Vietnam, the CIA miscalculated the strength and desire of
18 Ibid.
19 Turner, p. 21
20 Military Intelligence Officer Training Course
21 Ibid.
7the North Vietnamese fighters. The CIA did have success during this period as well, such as
predicting Sputnik, as well as efforts in Russia and the Middle East?2 More broadly, this period
also saw an expansion of the intelligence community with the creation of the National Security
Agency (NSA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
and the National Photographic Interpretation Center, an early precursor to today's National Geo-
Spatial Intelligence Agency (NGA)?3 Although the 1950's and 1960's saw great growth in the
intelligence fields, the 1970's saw curbs placed against the intelligence services. Much of this
had to do with the intelligence community being used for domestic purposes against civil rights
organizations and war protestors during the Vietnam War along with international efforts for the
removal of democratically elected governments.f" These efforts brought the intelligence
community under congressional oversight.
By the early 1990's, and the first Gulf War, the intelligence community had come of age.
During Operation Desert Shield / Desert Storm saw military intelligence become truly useful
from an upper level command standpoint. However, much of what occurred militarily occurred
on short notice prior to the war starting.P The intelligence community also correctly predicted
the invasion of Kuwait even though the community had been unable to forecast the end of the
cold war.26The findings after the first Gulf War were that militarily, intelligence was highly
successful working in a top down format, coming from the corps and division levels and being
pushed down to lower levels that were properly mannedr" This was a change from previous
22 Turner, p. 22, 24
23 Ibid., p. 23
24 Ibid., p. 24
25 BGJohn F. Stewart Jr., Operation Desert Storm the Military Intelligence Story: A View from the 6-2 3rd USArmy,
(Ft. McPherson, GA:3rd USArmy, 1991), p. 3, posted by The National Security Archive.
26 Turner, p, xii
27 BGStewart, p. 16-17
8conflicts where the lower levels were the collectors and analyzers and the upper levels acted as
information repositories and distribution centers. However, the push to man and equip lower
echelons with the proper personnel and equipment remained. National intelligence provided
support to the war fighter as well, however it was noted that the national agencies needed a way
to bring consensus to divergent analysis.28 While the gulf war itself was a success, the remainder
of the decade saw a number of intelligence failures from Africa, to the Balkans, Asia and the
Middle East.29
Terrorism directed towards the United States began to creep into the national
consciousness during the 1990's. Starting with the truck bombing of the World Trade Center in
1993, the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa and the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole in a Yemeni
port, trans-national, global terrorism had become a factor to be dealt with. That said though, in
2001, in light of reports indicating an impending terrorist attack on American soil, it was not
until mid-morning of September 11th that a true recognition of the terrorist threat was realized. 30
The errors leading to 9/11, coupled with the mistakes that provided the false pretenses to invade
Iraq, led to an attempted reorganization and redirecting of the intelligence community." At the
national level, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created by the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 which took on the roles of domestic security, while the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 created the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to
coordinate intelligence efforts across the intelligence community. Since the Vietnam War, the
28 United States Central Command, United States Central Command, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm,
Executive Summary, (Tampa Bay, Fl: United States Central Command, 11 July 1991), p. 20, posted by The National
Security Archive.
29 Turner, p. xii.
30 Thomas Powers, Intelligence Wars: American Secret History From Hitler to AI-Qaeda, (New York: The New York
review of Books, 2004), p. xi.
31 United States Committee on Government Affairs, Summary of Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004, (Washington: GPO, 6 December 2004), posted by The National Security Archive.
9intelligence community had become overly reliant on technology. The events of9/11 returned
the focus towards HUMINT.32
Completed Intelligence Reform
As mentioned above, the intelligence community has gone through numerous reforms in
an attempt to improve intelligence at the national level since 9/11. The DHS and its intelligence
arm, the Office ofIntelligence and Analysis (DHSOIA) were created "for the purpose of
preventing, protecting against, preparing for, and responding to threats of terrorism and other
threats [against the homeland].,,33 The DNI and the Office ofthe Director of National
Intelligence on the other hand were created in response to the 9/11 Commission report and were
designed to manage the entire intelligence community which was now at 17 agencies." While
both agencies are beneficial, they do not go far enough to address all the issues facing the
intelligence community.
The single biggest issue facing the DNI is the lack of budgetary and management control
over the other intelligence agencies." While technically having some budgetary control, the
various budgets are set in multiple committees in congress preventing a consolidation of the
intelligence community budget under the DNI.36While allowing for the continued classification
of the intelligence community budget, this diffusion of appropriations prevents the DNI from
32 Saxby Chambliss, "We Have Not Correctly Framed the Debate on Intelligence Reform," Parameters, Spring 2005
{Ft. Leavenworth, KS.:U.S.Army War College, 200S}, p. 11.
33 Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Summary of Legislation to Establish a Department of
Homeland Security, {Washington: GPO, December 2002}, p. 1.
34 United States Committee on Government Affairs, Summary of IRTPAof2004.
35 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "The Cultural Revolution in Intelligence: Interim Report," The Washington Quarterly 31
no. 2 {Spring 2008}, p. 49: Helen Fessenden, "The Limits of Intelligence Reform," Foreign Affairs 84 no. 6
{November-December 200S}, p. 107
36 Fessenden, p. 116
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having any actual budgetary control. 37 The primary budgetary issues came from the Department
of Defense (DOD) which did not want to relinquish budgetary control over its subordinate
agencies such as the DIA, NGA, NRO, NSA, and others.38 Not only has the DNI been saddled
with inadequate budgetary and managerial control, since its inception it has also watched over a
massive growth in personnel and contractors performing intelligence roles.'" The fact that the
DNI was created can be directly connected to 9/11 as its position or something similar had been
called for a number of times previously, but always passed over in the congress.t"
Not being tied to a single intelligence agency is the DNI's greatest benefit.t' This has
given the office the opportunity to push reforms across the entire community dealing with
connecting analysts between agencies. Another benefit the DNI has is the ability to recommend
or agree with appointments made to the other intelligence agencles.Y
Emerging Threats
Although terrorism has garnered the greatest amount of attention in the media since 9/11,
numerous other threats remain to national security. The unknown and changing situation in
North Korea with an eventual power succession, a potentially nuclear armed Iran, a continually
emergent and modernizing China, cyber network attacks and leaks along with lone-wolf
terrorism all need to be monitored. Even with the recent killing of Osama Bin Laden, trans-
national terrorism still remains a threat that needs to be monitored. All of these are areas that
need attention as they are the events that may potentially affect national security directly.
37 Ibid., p. 115
38 Ibid., p. 107
39 Dana Priest and William M. Arkin, "Top Secret America," Washington Post, 19 July 2010, Online edition.
40 Tucker, p. 48
41 United States Committee on Government Affairs, Summary o/IRTPA 0/2004, p.3
42 Ibid., p. 4
11
Of these threats that directly affect national security, North Korea is the most obvious.
North Korea already has plutonium based nuclear weapons, having tested a crude nuclear bomb
in 2006 and more efficient weapon in 2009.43 Furthering their nuclear efforts, an American
scientist was given a tour of North Korea's uranium enrichment facility, giving them the
capability of creating more effective weaponry.l" Kim Jong-Il has evidently identified his
youngest son, Kim Jong-Un as his apparent heir as the North Korean "Supreme Leader." This
has been accomplished through a series of promotions for Kim Jong-Un into successively higher
ranks up to supposedly the vice chairman of the National Defense Commission, second only to
his father." Over the last couple of years, the North has militarily provoked the South with
artillery shelling of a South Korean controlled island and the sinking of a South Korean naval
ship." These attacks are a continuance ofthe North's policy of brinkmanship. The past decade
has also seen efforts by the south in attempts to reunite the peninsula, but so far this has been a
one sided effort. As long as the North remains a separate entity, they will remain a destabilizing
factor in the region.
China poses both traditional and non-traditional threats to the security of the United
States. Although China has assisted the United States in dealing with North Korea their
assistance has never been consistent. China has also embarked on a rapid military modernization
over the past few years, working to achieve a modem air force with stealth technology along
with a naval force capable of projecting power.47 Additionally, China has attempted to exert its
43 Justin McCurry and Tania Branigan, "North Korea Tests Nuclear Weapon 'As Powerful as Hiroshima Bomb,'"
Guardian (Manchester), May 25, 2009.
44 Jay Solomon and Adam Entous, "North Korea Nuclear Fears Grow," Wall Street Journal, November 21, 2010.
45 Marc McDonald, "Kim Jong-il's Son is Reportedly Given No.2 Post," New York Times, February 16, 2011.
46 Martin Fackler, IIA Pattern of Aggression," New York Times, November 23; 2010.
47 Jeremy Page, "A Chinese Stealth Challenge?," Wall Street Journal, January 5, 2011: Ronald O'Rourke, China Naval
Modernization: Implications jor U.S. Navy Capabilities - Background and Issuesjor Congress, (Washington D.C.:
Congressional Research Service, April 22 2011) posted by Federation of American Scientists.
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power regionally in East and Southeast Asia through economic means, diplomatic issues with
regional states, and military efforts. Economically, China has recently become the second largest
single economy in the world.48 Diplomatically, China claims a number of island groups in the
South China Sea as well as the entirety of the South China Sea.49 While China's military
modernization is beneficial to the United States in that it provides another force capable of
interoperability on the global stage such as with the anti-piracy missiorr'"; it is a danger in that an
improved military becomes a threat to Taiwan, and other U.S. allies in Southeast and East Asia.
Coupled with China's economic abilities, their capability to influence actors regionally and
globally continues to grow.
In regards to non-traditional threats, China is accused of supporting cyber-warfare,
although the Chinese routinely deny all involvement in cyber-warfare.t' On top ofthis, the
Chinese own the largest portion of the United States' treasury securities of all foreign holders. 52
While not likely to require a traditional military response, a significant cyber attack would cause
a significant disruption to daily life in the United States with the reliance placed on electronic
systems throughout the country. On the other hand, a massive sell off of U.S. Treasury holdings
from China would cause significant devaluation of the U.S. Dollar as China owns nearly 25
percent of all foreign held treasury securities. 53 While currently this would significantly hurt
China as well, if China were to allow the Chinese Yuan to float on the global market, it would
give them incredible economic leverage against the United States.
48 CIA, The World Factbook, "Country Comparison: GDP," (Washington D.C.: GPO, 2011).
49 John Pomfret, "Beijing Claims 'Indisputable Sovereignty' Over South China Sea," Washington Post, July 31, 2010.
50 Associated Press, "U.S. Praises China Anti~Piracy Role Off Somalia," USA Today, February 28, 2009.
51 Simon Elegant, "Cyberwarfare: The Issue China Won't Touch," Time, November 18, 2009.
52 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities, (Washington, D.C.: April 2011)
53 Ibid.
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The cyber threat does not end with China though. As was seen with the wiki-Ieaks
incident, the cyber threat does not have to be actually from an external source. The wiki-Ieaks
episode showed that a single disgruntled government employee is capable of compiling a large
amount of information and giving it away to be posted to the global world. 54 Posting the
information to the global world is the greatest difference from the cold war where the typical spy
would be selling information to whatever country was paying them for the information. While
the immediate reaction would be to limit and further control access to information, this would
cause further issues of its own. As the 9/11 commission noted, one of the major factors that
allowed the attacks to occur was a lack of information sharing among agencies and
departments. 55
As mentioned, even with the death of Osama Bin Laden, terrorism remains a threat to the
national security of the United States. Information being slowly released shows that Bin Laden
retained operational control of Al Qaeda and the planning and approval of attacks. 56 While these
larger scale attacks remain a threat, there have been a number of successes of preventing these
attacks from occurring. These include the printer bombs from Yemen, the Fort Dix Five and
others. Where the greater threat lies is with lone wolf terrorism. The United States has been
lucky in this regard with the underwear bomber, the times-square bomber and the shoe bomber
were stopped before their attacks were.completed although they managed to get their explosives
to their targets.
54 Charlie Savage, "Soldier Faces 22 New WikiLeaks Charges," The New York Times, March 2, 2011.
55 Thomas H. Kean, et aI., The 9/11 Commission Report, Final Report of the National Commission On Terrorist
Attacks upon the United States by the 9/11 Commission, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2004).
56 Adam Entous, "U.S. Releases bin Laden Videos," The Wall Street Journal, May 8,2011.
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There are other events that may need contingency plans for humanitarian or diplomatic
assistance. These include natural and or manmade disasters, unforeseen revolutions in friendly or
non- friendly states and humanitarian disasters perpetrated by governments against their own
people. All of these areas need to have processes to help identify a crises before it happens or
immediately after and to be able to respond effectively. While not all of these events require a
response, having the knowledge and intelligence to back up a response is critical. The recent past
has shown the United States takes an active role in responding to natural disasters such as the
tsunamis in Asia, the earthquakes in Haiti and Pakistan along with others. Knowing information
about the infrastructure and culture of areas prior to providing humanitarian support allows such
missions to operate more efficiently. In regards to unforeseen revolutions, the "Arab Spring" has
shown that revolutions are capable of occurring essentially spontaneously. 57 While the United
States has a history of creating these revolutions or coups in countries in the past which needs to
be avoided, a necessity remains to know where they may occur. This is so that the United States
can be fully aware of the situation while allowing it to occur organically.
Needed Intelligence Reform
Looking at its history from earlier, the intelligence community was developed on an as
needed basis, responding to events that had occurred with only marginal efforts to look forward.
Events of the zo" century caused the United States to attempt to look further ahead; yet as 9/11
proved, the United States was still unable to see new threats. Although 9/11 spurred some needed
reforms, there are many that are still needed. These reforms are both internal to the intelligence
community as well as the community's relationship to external groups. It should be noted that as
with any bureaucracy, reform takes time to occur and solidify. As an example, the Department of
57 Michael Slackman, "Bullets Stall Youthful Push for Arab Spring," The New York Times, March 17, 2011
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Defense took over a decade to fully implement the reforms the Goldwater-Nichols Act.58 There
are four key areas that need to be addressed; intelligence community and congressional relations,
balancing collection between human and technical sources, improved foreign language
capabilities and finally balancing the differences between "tactical" and "national" intelligence.
Nancy BemkopfTucker states that the relationship between the intelligence community
and Congress needs to be corrected above all other reforms. While this is as much a reform of
Congress as it is the intelligence community, the oversight and appropriations functions of
Congress need to be reformed to solidify the reforms of intelligence community. 59
The Congressional appropriation process for intelligence is the area in most need of
reform. As mentioned previously, with the budgetary appropriations spread across multiple
committees in both houses of Congress it is impossible for the DNI to execute budgetary control
over the intelligence community. It is estimated that the DOD with its retained appropriations
receives nearly 80 percent of the total intelligence budget.P" Granted the DOD contains eight of
the 17 agencies that make up the intelligence community, an estimated 80 percent is still more
than its fair share of the budget. The integration and streamlining of the intelligence
appropriations process would allow the DNI the budgetary control granted to it by law. In order
for this to happen, the multitude of appropriations committees in both houses would have to
relinquish authority to a single intelligence appropriation committee per house. Along with this,
the separate agencies would have to give up their ability to request funds directly from Congress
and go through the DNI to request their budgets. The DNI would then submit a total intelligence
budget to Congress. Further, the DOD would need to give up the National Geo-Spatial Agency
58 Emma Ashburn, "Of Note, Intelligence Reform," SAIS Review, 28 no. 1 Winter-Spring (2008), p.139
59 Tucker, p. 54
60 Ibid., p. 49
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(NGA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the National Security Agency (NSA)
and allow them to become standalone agencies underneath the DNI. This would likely free up a
significant portion of the intelligence budget to be given to the DNI. These three particular
agencies provide national level support across the community and not just to the military
community. The DOD should retain the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Army,
Marine, Navy and Air Force intelligence services as they provide support specifically to the
military services. The Coast Guard intelligence service falls under the DHS and as such already
falls under the purview ofthe DNI.61
One of the major concerns of streamlining the budgetary process is that the information
would become declassified. According to the arguments, this would give the adversaries of the
United States vital information of what the United States places a priority on.62 This would be
true if the specifics ofthe budget were declassified. However, with a streamlined budgetary
request and appropriations process, only broad strokes of the budget would need to be
declassified. This would require the total amount of the intelligence budget to be declassified,
along with possibly broad areas underneath the total such as totals for personnel, equipment and
possibly programs. By declassifying sections of the intelligence community budget as such
would provide the country with a measure of transparency without divulging the most sensitive
portions of the budget. Ultimately this budgetary reform would accomplish two things; it would
give the DNI budgetary control over the majority of the intelligence community and it would
provide transparency of the budget to the nation.
61 Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
62 Fessenden, p. 117
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Not only does the budgetary process in Congress need to be improved, so does the
relationship of the intelligence community and the congressional oversight committees. Tucker
notes that partisanship in the congressional oversight committees has increased along with
requesting numerous reports from the intelligence community. All these reports require
intelligence professionals to report to Congress repeatedly, taking away from their time to
complete critical tasks.63 As with budgetary issues, these multiple reporting requirements come
from a diffuse process on intelligence in the various committees and sub-committees in
Congress. Streamlining congressional committees on intelligence will not only improve
budgetary control, but bring efficiency to the oversight functions as well.
Providing efficiency to the oversight functions will not fix all the problems. In order for
oversight to be fully effective, it has to be a give and take. If the oversight committees do not
provide constructive avenues to identify best practices along with mistakes in the intelligence
community, then their purpose is negated. Tucker points out that the friction between the
oversight committees and the intelligence community comes from both sides. The intelligence
community needs to become willing to share information with Congress and Congress needs to
be willing to actually pay attention to those in the intelligence community. As Richard Betts
points out, intelligence failures are rarely the fault of collectors or analysts, but the fault of the
decision makers who receive the products/" If the primary role of congressional oversight is to
identify errors, and if the committees are making the same errors the decision makers made
initially, then the committees are failing at their role.
63 Tucker, p.S3-S4
64 Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War,and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable," World Politics 31, no. 1
(October 1978), p. 61
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Looking back at the history of intelligence again, HUMINT played a significant role in
intelligence collection through WWI and WWII. During the two wars, the United States began
developing its technological collection capabilities. These technological capabilities, both in
imagery and signals collection, came to take prominence over the latter part of the 20th century,
supplanting HUMINT as a primary source of intelligence. Both forms of intelligence gathering
have their benefits as well as their drawbacks. Technological collection is great in that it can
reach areas where traditional spies cannot, however this form of collection rarely gets the full
intention of the target. HUMINT on the other hand has the benefit of being able to draw out
intentions of the collected information, although HUMINT collectors are limited in the areas in
which they can operate. Unfortunately, both technological collection methods and HUMINT
collection are subject to deception. By overly relying on one form or the other for intelligence
gathering leaves significant gaps in the information analysts have to work from. As both a U.S.
Representative and as a U.S. Senator, Saxby Chambliss (R.-GA) has called for increased
HUMINT, calling it the most important area to work on, to assist in the War on Terrorism.T
While HUMINT needed significant improvement after 9/11, doing so at the expense of other
collection forms would be counterproductive. Focusing primarily on HUMINT also would be
reactionary to the current conflict in line with the history of intelligence. Differing forms of
intelligence collection can and should cooperate together providing an all-source picture. 66
Rather than relying on a single source of information, an intelligence analyst should take
information from multiple sources and intelligence disciplines to come up with a relevant
analytical summary. This provides the difference between information and intelligence,
information being the raw data collected, whether it is a radio intercept, an image or answers to
65 Chambliss, p, 7
66 John Deutch and Jeffrey H. Smith, "Smarter Intelligence," Foreign Policy 128 (January - February 2002), p. 65
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an detainee's interview question, it only becomes intelligence after the information has been
analyzed and its relevance and accuracy determined. Relying on only one source of information
limits the ability to judge the information's relevance and accuracy. Had the information
provided to the then Secretary Colin Powell been checked against other sources, the briefing that
he gave to the United Nations may have gone differently/"
In balancing collection efforts between technological and HUMINT, the United States
will become more adept at recognizing emerging threats and situations. In order for the different
disciplines to work together this effectively requires further efforts towards interoperability of
the intelligence agencies. While efforts have been made to achieve this goal of interoperability,
further efforts need to be made. On top of this, the wiki-Ieaks episode should not be allowed to
prevent a further opening of the intelligence community amongst itself. Locking down the
intelligence channel in each agency in the name of security after the wiki-Ieaks issue would
return the intelligence community to where it was prior to 9/11.
One way to avoid this prevention of information sharing is to create inter-agency
intelligence centers. Modeled after the joint forces commands created by the Goldwater-Nichols
Act, these inter-agency centers would facilitate the sharing of information and best practices
between agencies. Following the requirement of the Goldwater-Nichols Act that the military
leadership is required to serve in joint positions to advance to the highest levels of the military,
intelligence professionals would be required to serve in these inter-agency centers in order to
progress to the most senior, non-appointed levels of the intelligence community. To ease the
effects on the military, these positions could be used to fulfill the requirement for a joint military
assignment as well.
67 Tucker, p. 51
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A lack of analysts and collectors trained in foreign languages has historically been another
shortfall in the intelligence community.P'' With the military's and the government's continued
involvement around the world, foreign language skills are a necessity. This was noted in 2000 by
Ellen Laipson, the then Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, in an address to the
Senate Government Affairs Committee. In April 2010, John Negroponte, a former ambassador,
and the first DNI, gave a speech noting the issues facing the Foreign Service in regards to
language proficiency. Even as far back as 1993, Richard Lambert noted the general need to
improve foreign language capability in the United States.
Laipson outlined how foreign language skills playa part in the intelligence cycle, "from
collection to exploitation to analysis and production.t'P" She also noted that while finished
intelligence products are in English, the sources they are based on often times are not. This
requires high levels of language proficiency in order to ensure proper interpretations. While
discussing the shortfalls in language abilities, Laipson noted key shortfalls in Arabic and Farsi
language ability in September 2000, nearly a full year prior to 9/11.70 Finishing, she outlined four
core principles that had been developed to guide improving language abilities in the intelligence
community. These priorities were focusing on important regions and countries, requirements
"driven by collection, analysis, and reporting," responsiveness to crises, and that capability
should be proportional to the need."
68 Clifford F. Porter Ph.D., Asymmetrical Warfare, Trans/ormation, and Foreign Language Capability, (Ft.
Leavenworth, KS:Army Combined Arms Center, Combat Studies Institute, 2006), p. 1
69 Ellen Laipson, "Foreign Language Requirements in the Intelligence Community," (address, Statement to Senate




In his April 2010 speech, former Ambassador John Negroponte called the need for
language qualified officers as the "greatest challenge" facing the State Department and the U.S.
Agency for International Development. This is even though their total number of officers had
increased in recent years.72Ambassador. Negroponte focused on the need for recruiting and
training, and most importantly keeping, officers in key languages and geographical areas to build
key contacts and expertise in their areas. Amongst this issue is the deployment of Foreign
Service Officers that are unable to communicate with the populations that they work with,
. 11 . 73especia y IIIcurrent war zones.
In 1993, Richard Lambert wrote more generally on the need to improve the foreign
language ability of adults in America. In his article, he discussed the issues facing language
competency at that time, namely a lack of competency in languages beyond a cursory level, and
a lack of a proper standard for measuring language competency. 74Lambert called for identifying
adult language needs that produce usable foreign language abilities among adults.75He further
called for a revamping of the Interagency Language Roundtable (ILR) and the American Council
on the Teaching of Foreign Languages (ACTFL) testing metrics. These metrics would be used to
determine the needs and the methods of teaching the needed language skills. In revamping these
metrics, Lambert called for a further revision of their lower levels for beginners and more
accurate testing standards for reading and writing 76.
72 John Negroponte, "Speech to the American Foreign Service Association," quoted in Joe Davidson, "Language
Proficiency Is Foreign Service's 'Greatest Challenge,' Negroponte Says." The Washington Post, sec. B: 03, 8 April
2010.
73 Ibid.
74 Richard D. Lambert, "The Improvement of Foreign Language Competency in the United States." Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science Foreign Language Instruction 490, A National Agenda, (1987).
75 Ibid., p. 12
76 Ibid., p. 13-14
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As noted issues regarding foreign language proficiency are not something new to the
United States. Progress has been made to improve proficiency levels overall along with the
diversification of languages studied, however gaps still remain. Many solutions have been
already been attempted, and many of those remain useful to closing these gaps in ability and
availability. Ultimately, the push to improve the foreign language abilities of Americans needs to
start at the elementary level, not just in adult education.
In order to improve foreign language abilities, the continued refinement and universal
adherence to language proficiency standards is paramount as stated by Lambert. The ACTFL has
updated their standards as recently as 1999 for oral, and 2001 for writing.77 While the ACTFL
does not provide testing requirements for listening and reading, the ILR does include testing and
rating for these, as well as translation and interpretation performancer" Furthering Lambert's
ideas, additional refining of the lower levels of language proficiency is required in order to judge
initial improvements in ability; or rather an all new scale needs to be created to measure the
performance of initial language learners. Along with the refining of testing standards, a push for
universal adherence to the standards needs to be achieved, starting at least at the secondary level
and possibly even down into the middle or elementary levels as well.
As proficiency standards become more universal, encouragement needs to given to
education institutions at all levels, from elementary to graduate, to increase and broaden their
language offerings. These offerings should include more than just the basic European languages,
and critical languages such as Arabic, Chinese and Russian, but should include Sub-Saharan
77 "ACTFLCertified Proficiency Testing Programs (oral and written) - American Council on the Teaching of Foreign
Languages," American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages,
http://www.actfl.org/i4a/pages/index.dm?pageid=3642.
78 "Introduction to ILR." Interagency Language Roundtable, http://www.govtilr.org/Skilis/ILRscalel.htm.
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African languages, Central Asian languages, as well as Southeast Asian languages; especially as
these areas continue to develop and become more prominent on the world stage. Where
traditional classroom education is not possible, distance learning technologies and computer
software should be utilized to their maximum potential. This will increase the availability of
languages to more areas and schools. Guidance needs to be provided by the National
Government in terms of specific languages that are required for the United States and its
diplomatic and intelligence communities. Further funding should also be made available to
increase overall ability in regards to promoting foreign language proficiency. Encouragement
should also be given to those that desire to become multilingual beyond only two languages.
The government guidance should be based on the four priorities that were given by Ms.
Laipson. Using these priorities will ensure that language education has increased relevancy in
regards to the needs of the country as well as the world. As languages are deemed vital to the
government, further incentives to teach and learn each of those languages identified could be
provided to encourage their study. This method would also allow for the continued study of
languages not identified by the government by those that so desire.
Increased language training and proficiency not only provides the ability to communicate
in other areas ofthe world, it also provides a needed understanding of foreign cultures. From an
intelligence standpoint this allows analysts and decision makers the ability to truly understand
their enemy.i" Having trained analysts and collectors also reduces the need for separate
translators as well. While dedicated translators, both verbal and written, will always be required
to assist in the translation of excess documents and communication assistance, language
proficient analysts and collectors improve the quality of finished intelligence products by
79 Porter, p. 1
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inherently understanding the cultural differences of the area in which they operate. The same is
true for diplomats working in foreign countries as well.
Finally, all the reforms discussed so far impact the balancing of the need between
"tactical" and "national" intelligence. In their roughest forms, tactical intelligence collects
information in the field and provides information to military commanders conducting operations,
while national intelligence uses technology controlled by "national agencies" to collect
information and provides this information to decision makers in Congress and the White House.
Senator Chambliss calls these definitions archaic.f" However, Senator Chambliss is discussing
primarily the ability to collect information while only glossing over the recipients. However, he
does make a good point; in that over all, intelligence needs to be useful to the president while
also providing timely information to the soldier in the field from all levels. 81
Intelligence should not be defined by who collects the information, but by who receives
the information. It should also be understood that finished intelligence may be utilized by all
levels, not just service members in the field or by politicians in D.C. This further reinforces the
need to move the previously mentioned agencies out of the Department of Defense. Senator
Chambliss called for the creation of INTCOM82 to unify the multiple military intelligence
agencies under one commander.Y Chambliss envisions this command to oversee all eight of the
intelligence services currently under the DOD.84
80 Chambliss, p. 8
81 Ibid. p. 13
82 Although not explicitly stated in his article, INTCOM likely stands for Intelligence Command.
83 Chambliss, p. 11
84 Ibid.
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The intent of this command would be to give the DNI a single point of contact for all
DOD intelligence services. While this is a worthwhile idea, it would be more efficient to move
the NGA, NRO and NSA out of the DOD directly under the control of the DNI and utilize the
DIA as the single point of contact for military intelligence related issues. The three separated
intelligence agencies would maintain their missions to support the war fighter. However as
agencies that support both the military and the government, NGA, NRO and NSA will be better
utilized under the control ofthe DNI.
As mentioned, the previously discussed areas of intelligence reform affect the balance of
national and tactical intelligence. Ultimately intelligence is about getting the right information to
the right person at the right time.85 Notice the lack of who provides the information, the recipient
is the primary focus. Improving the relationship of the intelligence community and Congress will
provide the ability to make the structural changes needed to make this possible. Along with this,
Congress is only entity that can provide the DNI the full authority he needs to ensure that the
proper intelligence is being produced and disseminated to the appropriate recipient.
Secondly, balancing human versus technical collection assists in balancing tactical and
national intelligence. Once again, redefining tactical versus national intelligence as the recipient
instead of the provider does much of this. It is entirely possible that a soldier on patrol or an
interrogator in a prison could provide a vital piece of information that allows the President the
ability to make decision as an example of "tactical" asset providing "national" intelligence. On
the other hand, satellite imagery or a UAV video feed could provide the necessary information to
a soldier in a war zone as an example of "national" assets providing "tactical" intelligence.
85 Chambliss, p.13
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However, it should be re-noted, HUMINT is one ofthe areas that the intelligence community is
lacking in and needs to be strengthened. 86
Finally, language training further improves the balance of intelligence. Having analysts
and collectors proficient in foreign languages at all levels of the intelligence community only
improves the community's ability to recognize and responds to situations around the world.
Having soldiers in the field proficient in the language and culture of their operating environment
allows them to provide their commanders with immediate assessments of information. These
same service members would also be capable of immediately recognizing information of
importance that needs to be passed to higher levels. At the national agencies, having language
proficient analysts and collectors allows these agencies to manage the vast amounts of
information collected and disseminate the appropriate information to the appropriate levels.
Conclusions
In discussing the intelligence community, the intent was to see if intelligence missed
emerging threats by being focused on current and previous conflicts. If this were the case, the
intent was also to see how or if recent reforms to the intelligence community had affected this
trend.
In retrospect, the history of the intelligence community in the United States, was initially
found to be far worse than just being focused on the previous conflict. The intelligence
community only reacted at the start of a conflict playing catch up to provide the necessary
information. This was due to that between conflicts; intelligence was never a primary focus until
the early twentieth century. As permanent intelligence services were created in response to the
86 Chambliss, p. 11
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world wars, issues continued to remain. The military services had to continually evolve their use
of intelligence as conflicts progressed. With the government becoming militarily involved in
more areas of the world, a lack of personnel trained in the languages ofthese areas became an
issue as well. The latter half ofthe twentieth century saw an increased reliance on technological
efforts for information collection as well.
While the first gulf war was a success for the intelligence community, the end of the
century saw a number of issues the intelligence community missed and were unprepared for. The
terrorist attacks of the late 1990s and 9/11 further cemented the intelligence community's
inability to recognize the emerging threat.
Since 9/11, a number of intelligence reforms have been passed to improve the
intelligence process. However, other than a handful of reforms attempted internally, these
reforms do little to assist the intelligence community in looking forward. The reforms enacted by
Congress improved and streamlined the command structure of intelligence community, however
further reforms are still needed to ensure that another significant event does not catch the
intelligence community off guard.
In looking at all of this, the intelligence community has regularly been unprepared for
new threats and conflicts. On a positive note though, the history also shows the intelligence
community to be highly adaptable to meet the needs of the issue or event at hand. While being
adaptable has been a useful quality for the intelligence community, this adaptation only occurs
after an event requires the community to adapt to it. As long as the intelligence community
maintains this pattern, another event such as 9/11 or Pearl Harbor or even the fall of the Soviet
Union can and likely will occur in the future. While an event such as these will likely occur
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sometime in the future, if the intelligence community moves to a forward focused institution, the
impact on the national security will be decreased. The varying threats the United States faces,
from natural and humanitarian disasters to traditional all out war and everything in-between,
requires an intelligence community that is highly flexible and forward looking.
As discussed, there are a number of reforms proposed to prepared the intelligence
community for the future. Of the mentioned reforms, improving the relationship between
Congress and intelligence community needs to come above all others. Reforming the balance
between human and technical intelligence can be accomplished internally to the community.
However, if Congress is willing to work with the intelligence community, this goal can be
achieved more efficiently. While the redefinition of intelligence can be accomplished by the
community, the definition loses its effect if policy makers do not understand the difference
between defining tactical and national intelligence based on who collects the information or who
receives the information. Looking at improving the nations secondary language capability will
require congressional assistance as well. Ultimately, to fully implement the reforms needed, the
intelligence community needs to be able to work with Congress.
The intelligence community and policy makers need to move from defining tactical and
national intelligence by the method of collection and define the difference by who receives the
product. No one agency serves one customer exclusively. In redefining the difference in tactical
and national intelligence in this way removes the distinction of whether an agency is military or
national. This further allows for a portion of the intelligence agencies beneath the DOD to be
moved under the DNI to efficiently utilize the resources available to the intelligence community.
In moving the NGA, NRO and NSA from the DOD, allows these agencies to better support the
intelligence, military and government communities. Moving these agencies would not change
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their overall mission, it would only recognize their role in providing information to both the
military and government.
The balance of human and technical collection efforts needs to be addressed as well.
Intelligence collection has become increasingly reliant on technology while utilizing human
collectors less. This has left the intelligence community with gaps in its ability to gain
information on relevant groups around the world. As mentioned previously though, technical
collection can gather information from places that human collection is unavailable as well as the
opposite. That being said, there needs to be balance in the ability to collect information rather
than favoring one method over the other. In balancing collection abilities across the intelligence
community will further lead to improved cross agency communication. To assist in this,
interagency intelligence centers should be created similar to the joint forces commands in the
military. Requiring intelligence professionals to work in these interagency centers will improve
information sharing among the agencies.
Improving secondary language capabilities needs to be a national priority. The lack of
properly trained language personnel has been a failure in the intelligence community for much of
its history. In order for the intelligence community to maintain and improve its ability to
recognize and respond to events around the world, foreign language skills need to be improved.
While language training can be provided to members of the intelligence community once they
join, in order to have truly proficient speakers, language education needs to begin in elementary
school. Along with pushing for improved language training at all education levels, revisions to
foreign language testing standards need to follow. These improvements to the testing standards
will provide more accurate benchmarks in which to judge language progression. There are
multiple ways to improve language education in the country which need to be implemented.
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Finally, although the intelligence community has proven itself to be adaptable and has
seen significant reforms since 9111, further reforms are needed. If further reforms are not
implemented in the intelligence community, the community risks being caught unprepared with a
future event. By implementing the proposed reforms above, the intelligence community can
prepare itself to meet the needs of the country for now and into the future, regardless of the event
or threat faced. In doing so, intelligence will be able to remain relevant beyond the Global War
on Terrorism.
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